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This chapter focuses on a concrete case study in Turkey’s close neighborhood. I examine the exceptional 
role played by a social and religious organization that is unique in the Muslim world, namely the movement 
of Fethullah Gülen. The following questions are addressed: To what extent did the Gülen movement 
contribute to the development of Turkey’s soft power in both the South Caucasus and the Middle East? 
Reciprocally, how did the Gülen movement benefit from the government’s support and prestige to develop 
its own influence? Finally, I question the durability of the bond between Gülen and Turkey’s soft power 
through the lens of the clash between Gülen, the charismatic leader of the hizmet movement, and Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan, the even more charismatic leader of the Turkish executive power since 2002.
Today’s hizmet (“service”) and yesterday’s cemaat (“community” or “congregation”) movements 
are rooted in movements dating back to the late 1960s. Born in 1938, Fethullah Gülen grew up in the 
eastern part of Turkey, where traditionally conservative and religious ideas are dominant. Like many of his 
contemporaries in the region living close to the Soviet border, Gülen also grew up with anti-communist 
sentiments. Significantly, he acquainted himself with the ideas of naqshibendiyya, a prestigious Sufi 
brotherhood of Central Asian origin that had become very influential in Turkey. Additionally, the ideas 
of Sait Nursi, a leading religious thinker and activist whose ideas and legacy are still very widespread in 
contemporary Turkey, deeply influenced Gülen’s own beliefs. Gülen’s career is strongly associated with the 
Diyanet, the official state body that manages religious issues in Turkey. 
Religiously speaking, the movement subscribes to a moderate Turkish Sunni Islam with a significant 
Sufi dimension, a quality shared by most Turkish Islamic movements. The young Fethullah Gülen was 
an anti-communist nationalist, who displayed a clear admiration for a strong state, and was an early and 
authentic admirer of the Ottoman legacy. Different from other Turkish movements, the Gülen cemaat is 
very active in the social sphere, especially in education and the media. Its members manage strong media 
groups as well as an impressive network of private schools, prep schools, private dormitories, and other 
educational institutions across the country.
When the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) came to power in 2002, things changed in Turkey. 
The AKP shifted the focus of its foreign policy from securitization to desecuritization of the state. The 
demands for democratization in the context of Turkish candidacy to the European Union justified the 
AKP reforms to limit the role of the army in Turkish politics. In the early 2000s, both the AKP and 
Gülen movement had converging interests. Both share the same social grass roots, i.e. the conservative 
Anatolian elites that  had  been  excluded  and  marginalized  by the more Westernized Kemalist elites 
for many years. Their interpretation of Islam shared commonalities, although the AKP was historically 
and relatively more influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood ideology, and Gülen by the more mystical 
Sufi Islam of Central Asian origin. Despite minor differences, the political Islam of the AKP and the 
more social Islam of the cemaat shared enough of a common ground to build an alliance. This common 
ground also shared a common rival in the powerful military and the Kemalist elites who were both very 
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suspicious of these two religious forces, believing the AKP and Gülen movement to be nurturing a hidden 
agenda to impair the secular character of the country. The alliance helped to shake the omnipotence and 
the omnipresence of the military.
Together, Erdoğan and Gülen put an end to the supremacy of the army in both domestic and 
foreign affairs. But, once the common enemy of the army and Kemalist establishment were drawn aside, 
personal and ideological discrepancies rose to the surface. Gradually, their alliance and friendship eroded 
into a more suspicious and competitive relationship. The ultimate break occurred in December 2013. The 
Gülen movement knew that the AKP was determined to eradicate the hizmet in Turkey, especially when, 
in October 2013, the government announced its decision to close its prep schools, leaving the cemaat 
no choice but to strike back. Thanks to sympathizers working in the police and the judiciary, the hizmet 
revealed via social media several cases of corruption among high-ranking officials, some of whom had 
close ties to the Erdoğan government, and some who were members of Erdoğan’s own family. Vindictive 
and paranoid, the Turkish prime minister is now waging a war against the hizmet. Numerous members, or 
alleged members, of the Gülen movement were sacked or removed from the police and judiciary sector, 
and some were arrested. The repression expands outside national borders, as the hizmet draws much of its 
strength from its transnational network. Given Erdoğan’s stance against the hizmet, what are his chances 
of eradicating the hizmet? And how will his actions impact on Turkish foreign policy?
While they were allies, the Turkish government and the Gülen movement helped to develop a 
powerful Turkish presence and influence in their immediate regional environment and beyond. Placing 
Turkey on the worldwide map was beneficial to both sides; but now the break will likely harm both 
sides, an outcome for which both share responsibility. The hizmet could not and would not approve the 
AKP’s authoritarian turn, and the hizmet’s politicization away from its initial mystic and apolitical identity 
challenged and threatened the government. The break leaves no winner, but one loser: Turkish soft power, 
not only in Western Asia but everywhere that it made a difference and made a promising opening for 
Turkish influence.   
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